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Natural Right, Providence, and Order: Frédéric
Bastiat’s Laissez-Faire
Raimondo Cubeddu and Antonio Masala
Abstract
The paper suggests that Bastiat’s theory of interests, harmony, and the State is rooted in a
particular conception of Natural Right, in which the Lockeans and thomistic streams of thought
meet. But it also suggests that Bastiat’s interpretation of the role that Providence plays in human
events is not able to give a sustainable theory of liberal order. The paper also considers the
criticisms to Bastiat’s economic and political theory coming from exponents of classical
liberalism, from the Austrians, and from Catholic thinkers of that time, such as L. Taparelli
d’Azeglio and M. Liberatore.
The conclusion is that although the economic theory of Bastiat is by now obsolete from the
conceptual point of view, his political theory and his criticism of the state do remain
extraordinarily topical.
Cet article suggère que les théories des intérêts, de l’harmonie et de l’Etat de Bastiat sont
ancrées dans une conception particulière du droit naturel au confluent des pensées lockéenne et
thomiste. Cependant, il suggère aussi que l’interprétation que donne Bastiat du rôle de la
Providence dans les affaires humaines ne débouche pas sur une théorie recevable de l’ordre
libéral. L’article examine aussi les critiques qu’adressent les partisans du libéralisme classique-tels
que les économistes autrichiens, les penseurs catholiques de l’époque comme L. Taparelli
d’Azeglio et M. Liberatore-à l’égard des théories économiques et politiques de Bastiat. L’article
conclut que le caractère obsolète des théories de Bastiat d’un point de vue conceptuel ne remet pas
en cause la singulière actualité de sa théorie politique et de sa critique de l’Etat.
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NATURAL RIGHT, PROVIDENCE, 
AND ORDER: FREDERIC BASTIAT’S
LAISSEZ FAIRE
Raimondo Cubeddu° & Antonio Masala°°
1. Introduction
The success and influence of Frédéric Bastiat’s1 ideas are almost inversely
proportional to his scientific reputation outside the economic and political 
tradition of classical liberalism, a reputation that has not always been extended 
and unconditional. Bastiat’s political success and scientific reputation were affected
by the spread of the Millian paradigm and, more generally, of the Anglo-American
paradigm, to the detriment of the French tradition; and by the subsequent
development of marginalist economics. These trends shifted the general focus of
interest away from Bastiat’s central concerns, thus rendering his analytical and
conceptual apparatus obsolete.2 Therefore, as can already be inferred from Gide
and Rist’s Histoire des doctrines économiques (1909), Bastiat’s success as a
theoretical economist was confined mostly to France, where he exerted such strong
influence as to precipitate talk of a specific ‘French School of Economics’.3
Paradoxically, his great capacity to explain the issues and propositions of
nineteenth-century economics in an immediately clear and usable manner only
served to raise the charge of superficiality, leading to his characterization of a mere
popularizer of economic theory. A typical example is the judgement expressed by
Joseph A. Schumpeter in his 1954 History of Economic Analysis:
° Professor of Political Philosophy, University of Pisa (rcubeddu@dsp.unipi.it)
°° Phd student of Political Philosophy, University of Pisa.
1 For a general overview on Bastiat, see Roche-1993 and Solal/Zouache-2000, pp. 409-20.
2 See Rothbard-1995, II, pp. 441ff. Rothbard maintains that Bastiat’s contribution to economic theory
should be seen as an effort toward overturning classical Smithian economy, but that it stops short of
being ‘pre-Austian’.
3 Gide/Rist-1909, pp. 385-407. However, other scholars reject the notion of a ‘French school’ generated
and developed around Bastiat’s teaching. See, for example, Béraud/Etner-1993.
Volume 11, numéro 2/3, Juin/Septembre 2001, pp 311-336.
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…his name might have gone down to posterity as the most
brilliant economic journalist who ever lived. But […he lacked…]
power to handle the analytical apparatus of economics. I do not
hold that Bastiat was a bad theorist. I hold that he was no theorist.
This fact was bound to tell in what was essentially a venture in
theory, but does not affect any other merits of his.4
In Pascal Salin’s words, Bastiat was a victim of the fact that “les gens ont tendance à
confondre l’aspect scientifique et l’aspect incompréhensible”.5 Today, while there
might be concensus that his contribution to economic analysis was not particularly
original, it must nevertheless be admitted that both his political insights and his
talent for dissemination of economic ideas were seminal and original. This is
especially noteworthy when we consider the lack of writers in the classical liberal
tradition who were effective theorists and disseminators at the same time.
All things considered, the factor that was particularly detrimental to
Bastiat’s scientific reputation was his theory of the spontaneous harmonization of
interests (whose ‘providentialistic’ component is almost always neglected6) which
seemed to be so naively optimistic as to appear superficial. Similarly, as regards his
oft-derided notion of laissez faire, what Bastiat himself wrote has almost always
been overlooked: “pour prevenir toute équivoque: que laissez faire s’applique ici
aux choses honnêtes, l’État étant institué précisément pour empêcher les choses
déshonnêtes.” It is also frequently noted that in his day the cry for limits to be
placed on opportunities for individual choice (motivated by the fact that individuals
could make mistakes) rather paradoxically came precisely from those who, at one
and the same time, pressed for universal suffrage and the government of
everybody over everybody, while judging those very same individuals who were
deemed to be capable of governing others as incapable of governing themselves.7
Numerous objections were raised against Bastiat’s notion of the prospective
harmony of interests. For instance, Bastiat was attacked towards the end of the
nineteenth century by the Italian libertarian anarchist Francesco Saverio Merlino.8
4 Schumpeter-1954, p. 500.
5 Salin-1993a, p.15.
6 See Croce-1932, p. 125. Croce wrote that the widespread hope that all conflicts could be pacified by
“liberal economic expedients […] could not be conceived of but by placing, after all, the law of history
beyond history itself, as can be seen, in fact, in the most popular amongst these advocates and utopians
of liberalism, Bastiat, who had a sort of religious background midway between faith in nature, in line
with eighteenth-century philosophy, and faith in a provident God.” Moreover Croce (1927, p. 12), who
tried to provide liberalism with an ethical-political basis by placing it above the economic sphere
(‘liberismo’), positions Bastiat among those who did a disservice to liberalism by attempting to
transform “legitimate economic principle […] into illegitimate ethical theory, […] whose main criterion
for the definition of good is the maximum satisfaction of desires as such […]. These connections
between liberalism and ethical utilitarianism are well known, as is the fact that one of the forms of
utilitarianism, the one popularized by Bastiat, attempted to idealize itself in a general cosmic harmony,
as Nature’s law or law of Divine Providence ”.
7 Bastiat-1993, p. 114.
8 Merlino was widely recognized for his criticism of Marxist socialism from an ‘Austrian’ point of view
(see Cubeddu-1999), and for his debate with Gustav de Molinari in the Journal des Economistes (see
Merlino-1890a, 1890b).
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Merlino rejected Bastiat’s claims (as well as those of Gustav de Molinari and
Herbert Spencer, whose theses on the state and its functions were deemed by
Merlino – rather curiously for an anarchist – to be “so exasperatingly negative”9).
He contended that Bastist’s assertion that “men’s interests, when left to themselves,
tend to form harmonious combinations and to work together for progress and the
general good”10 was naive and empirically false,11 especially in the very period
when the state had transferred its functions to the market and the government itself
became – using a famous expression uttered by Marx – ‘the committee of affairs of
the bourgeoisie’. What made Bastiat’s ideas appear unrealistic was the real condition
of the proletariat of his time, and the political and economic power exerted by the
bourgeoisie. In the final analysis, this was why Bastiat was unsuccessful, and even
discredited for such a long time, to the point that his discredit reflected on the
whole of classical liberalism.
As a matter of fact, the reputation enjoyed by Bastiat among many
important scholars, and in particular economists who today defend classical
liberalism, was neither homogeneous nor uniformly positive, and this was so
beyond any influence exerted by his defense of laissez faire and his criticism of
protectionism. Paradoxically enough, the first criticism came from one of his
greatest admirers: the Italian liberal economist and politician, Francesco Ferrara. In
his extensive introduction to the Italian translation of Bastiat’s Harmonies
économiques, written in 1851, Ferrara laid down a series of inescapable critical
observations, both against Bastiat’s theory of value and also against the possible
consequences of basing liberalism on such a theory of human action. Ferrara’s
critique, which anticipates comments later advanced by Carl Menger and Eugen
von Böhm-Bawerk, denounced Bastiat’s theory of value as “damaging to science
[...because] his system could turn into a weapon that some sort of ingenious
socialism would not hesitate to exploit in order to attack our system of freedoms
with our very own principles”. Ferrara concluded: “I don’t understand how Bastiat,
when he wrote his Harmonies, failed to see at any point that his theory of value-
service was on the threshold of communism, on the one hand, and of despotism,
on the other.” Consequently, “once we have thrown this terrible dice of value-
service, it is logically impossible to stand firmly on the ground of freedom that we
will have marked out for ourselves.”12 These were harsh words, even though
uttered by an ardent admirer who believed firmly in the distinction between ends
and means.13 The means employed by Bastiat were, in Ferrara’s view, not only
inappropriate, but also erroneous and dangerous. Ultimately, what he doubted
9 See Merlino-1893b, pp. 200-02.
10 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 2-7; Engl. transl. pp. xxi-xxvi.
11 See Merlino-1893a, p. 156.
12 Ferrara-1851, p. 11-18. On Ferrara and Bastiat see Guidi-1995, pp. 225ff. and Faucci-1995, pp. 171-72
and 198-99.
13 This criticism is analysed by Pareto-1902-03, II, pp. 47ff.; but is not mentioned by Rothbard-1995
during his assessment of Bastiat’s success, where he remembers Ferrara and Pareto only as his admirers
(see II, pp. 448-49).
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most was whether Bastiat’s theory of value-service would ever be able to balance
conflicting interests, as correctly understood, and therefore whether it could build
up a theory of political order based on individual freedom.
Marco Minghetti, an illustrious scholar and politician who served as
President of the Council of Ministers from 1873 to 1876, echoed the same themes in
his Della economia pubblica e delle sue attinenze colla morale e col diritto [On
public economics and its relevance to morals and law], published in 1859. Like
Ferrara,14 Minghetti emphasized the practical limitations of Bastiat’s political ideas.
Minghetti was the last exponent of the so-called Historical Right [Destra storica]
that forged a united Italy based on a liberal economic ideal. Like Ferrara, Minghetti
admired Bastiat’s ideas, but underscored its weaknesses. In particular, both writers
were skeptical of the theory of labor and the natural products of the earth;15 the
theory of free value; that of ‘equivalent service’.16
Lord Acton, on the other hand, perhaps because he, too, was a liberal
Catholic, was one of the few to express appreciation of Bastiat’s theory according
to which “legitimate self-interest falls into a harmonious social pattern”, even
though that term ‘legitimate’ resounds as emblematic and may appear to limit the
conditions for harmony.17 Similar praise, although mixed with critical comments,
14 See Gherardi-1986, pp. 72 e 426.
15 Minghetti-1859, pp. 194-95.
16 Minghetti-1859, p. 200. Apart from such economic criticism, which is nonetheless indicative of the
fact that Bastiat’s ideas raised reservations even amongst the liberals of his time, what strikes us most is
the fact that Minghetti realises that, since “inequality between effort and product […] is a notion that
dominates the whole economy”, Bastiat’s argumentation “hurts Bastiat himself” (Minghetti-1859, p. 202).
Furthermore, Minghetti distanced himself from the role attributed by Bastiat to Providence in human life
by observing: a) that his laissez faire does not take into consideration that which he defines as “the law
of transitions [legge dei trapassi] […] according to which, since the different economic elements proceed
unevenly and in different proportions, consequent friction and conflict are virtually inevitable”; b) that
Bastiat, while stating that private and public interest coincide, attributes an excessively wide role to
private interest within the process of establishment of harmony and forgets the other gifts “assigned by
the Creator to accomplish the work”, these being “virtue and sacrifice”; c) that, even though Bastiat
“insists on the differences between near and remote effects”, he does not take into consideration that
the agreement that leads to public good “requires perspicacity and training”; that, given the limited
nature of human knowledge, “what is useful does not always correspond to what is honest”, and that
therefore, and after all, d) “for freedom to be used properly, it must necessarily be cleared up by a
higher guide: morals.” Not to mention the fact that usefulness follows justice and that, if “exchange is to
involve equivalent services”, “efforts that had a cost for their possessors”, the products and services
should be “equivalent in the judgment of the buyer and the seller; for, without such a judgment, no
exchange would take place […;] one cannot argue, therefore, that there is an equation between the
usefulness of a product and its value; and similarly, one cannot claim that there is an equation between
its value and the effort is cost to obtain it” (see Minghetti-1859, pp. 326-28). After expressing his
reservations on the theory of capital as well (Minghetti-1859, p. 328), Minghetti continues his criticism of
Bastiat’s theories by commenting that “bad behavior by the governments and their excessive
interference are not enough to account for the greatness and decadence of the peoples”; “if, finally, the
natural law that leads to the good of humanity could be so obviously followed, why should there be so
many wars and ruin?” His conclusion is that “freedom is the rule in economic matters, it is the principle
we fully assume and adhere to. But we must add that in order for freedom to be properly practiced and
in order to establish the desired agreement between the private and public interest, upright judgement
and morals are necessary” (Minghetti-1859, pp. 333-34).
17 Acton-1985, II, p. 489.
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was pronounced by Vilfredo Pareto in his Cours d’économie politique (1896-97)
and in his later work, Les Systèmes socialistes (1902-03).18
The tendency of Bastiat’s early critics to question specific aspects of his
thought without expressly disputing his theoretical structure was soon reversed by
the Austrians.  Menger wrote in his Grundsätze (1871) that the efforts of Bastiat,
Canard, Carey, Wirth and Rösler are to be ranked among the
…numerous attempts to fit land and the services of land
into the framework of a system of economic theory with all other
goods, and to trace their values and the prices they fetch back to
human labor or to the services of capital, in conformity with the
accepted principles.
Menger considered this to be a ‘forced interpretation’, which did not take into
account that the value of these goods derives from the “importance goods attain
for us solely because they assure us future satisfactions.”19 Like Ferrara, Menger
also advanced the key criticism that Bastiat did not grasp the difference between
“use value” and “exchange value”.20 Menger therefore believed that Bastiat’s
political theory was grounded in error, one that not only nullifies his theory, but
also offers more than a mere foothold to non-liberal thinkers. 
Böhm-Bawerk took up the same argument in Kapital und Kapitalzins
(1884), where he maintained that “Bastiat’s theory of interest, which has been the
subject of a great deal of altercation, can perhaps be described as a copy of
Senior’s abstinence theory, which has been forcibly squeezed into the mold of
Bastiat’s theory of value.”21 He also attacked Bastiat’s theory of interest as logically
contradictory, among other things.22 The low esteem in which Böhm-Bawerk held
Bastiat’s theory of capital and interest led him to denounce, together with
McCulloch, Roscher and Strasburger, those who, by advancing unsound theory,
gave an advantage to
…the exploitation theory and to its wide dissemination
[…]. As long as the scientific controversy was conducted on the
18 Cf., Pareto-1896-97, §§ 581, 593, 637, 839, 1042. Also see Pareto-1902-03, I, p. 125, where he writes
“en France, toute l’économie politique était libérale, les admirables pamphlets de Bastiat en avaient
rendu populaires les doctrines […].” Elsewhere, Pareto-1902-03, I, pp. 353ff., 381, 383-87 and discusses
Bastiat versus Proudhon; and Pareto-1902-03, II, pp. 46ff., 63ff wonders what determines the success of
ideas, noting that, even though Bastiat’s theory of value is as incorrect as Marx’s, it has been presented
as “une dégération des doctrines libérales”).
19 Menger-1871, pp. 145-46 e n.; Engl. transl. pp. 166-67.
20 Menger-1871, pp. 215-16 e n.; Engl. transl. p. 228 and p. 308.
21 Böhm-Bawerk-1884, I, p.191. Pantaleoni-1889, p. 342, declared that Bastiat was “severely mistreated“
by Böhm-Bawerk, but did not take sides on this issue.
22 Since in this circumstance they are more interesting than their content and plausibility, we will only
transcribe a part of the expressions: “that, quite briefly, is the substance of Bastiat’s doctrine, delivered
with rhetorical verbosity and frequent repetition”; “performing a complete logical somersault”; “Bastiat’s
explanation reveals the fact that he has been misled into a number of incredibly gross errors […]. It is
really difficult to understand how Bastiat could be guilty of error on matters so simple and so much a
matter of common knowledge […] And so on the whole, Bastiat’s interest theory seems to me to fall far
short of deserving the good reputation which, at least in certain circles, it has so long enjoyed” (Böhm-
Bawerk-1884, I, pp. 191-94).
5
Cubeddu and Masala: Natural Right, Providence, and Order
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2001
basis of such equally vulnerable theories as those of productivity,
abstinence or remuneration […] the battle could not have an
outcome unfavorable to socialists. Their enemies could not attack
their true weaknesses from such ill-chosen positions; their
opponents’ weak attacks could be repulsed without any great
difficulty, and the enemy victoriously pursued into his own camp
[…].23
In the light of these considerations, it is not surprising that Böhm-Bawerk judged
Bastiat’s theory negatively: “Bastiat’s theory of value […], which for a certain period
of time was highly esteemed, but then fell into a condition of complete discredit,
should be judged as a sui generis confutation, more formal and rhetorical than
substantial, of classical theory.”24
Bastiat fare little better at the hands of second-generation Austrians.
Evaluating the ‘invisible hand’ theories of Smith and Bastiat, Mises argued that the
authors’ theism does not invalidate their scientific propositions concerning human
action, even though today, except for the criticism of protectionism, they can be
considered “obsolete”.25 Hayek wrote a rather indifferent introduction to Bastiat’s
Selected Essays on Political Economy, in 1964;26 but otherwise mostly ignored
Bastiat in his own writings. We may well ask, therefore, whether it is legitimate to
speak of Bastiat as an ‘Austrian’ or a precursor of the ‘Austrians’, since he was so
roundly criticized by the pioneers of the Austrian tradition.27
23 Böhm-Bawerk-1884, I, pp. 320-21.
24 Böhm-Bawerk-1894, p. 995n.
25 See Mises-1927, p. 197. As regards Smith’s theory and Bastiat’s theory of the ‘invisible hand’, Mises-1949,
p. 147n. writes: “Many economists, among them Adam Smith and Bastiat, believed in God. Hence they
gloried in the fact that they had discovered the providential care of “the great Director of Nature.”
Atheistic critics blame them for this attitude. However, these critics fail to realize that to express disdain
for the “invisible hand” does not invalidate the essential teachings of the rationalist and utilitarian social
philosophy.” Mises-1957, pp. 168-69, confirms the same notion by writing: “believing in the existence of
God, Smith could not help tracing back all earthly things to him and his providential care, just as later
the Catholic Bastiat spoke of God’s finger […] The pre-established harmony to which they alluded did
not affect their epistemological principles and the methods of their reasoning. It was merely a device to
reconcile the purely secular and mundane procedures they applied in their scientific efforts with their
religious beliefs […]. For the agnostic, atheistic, and antitheistic historians and economists there is no
need to refer to Smith’s and Bastiat’s invisible hand […]. Thus the theological views of Smith and Bastiat
no longer have any meaning for our age.”
26 Hayek-1964, pp. ix-xii.
27 See, for example, DiLorenzo-1999, pp. 59-60, who writes that Bastiat, together with other French
economists such as F. Quesnay, D. de Tracy, J. B. Say, Ch. Comte, R. Cantillon; A. R. J. Turgot, can be
considered precursors of the Austrian School, “having first developed such concepts as the market as a
dynamic, rivalrous process, the free-market evolution of money subjective value theory […].” DiLorenzo
credits Bastiat with a contribution to the Austrian theory of capital (p. 62) and identifies him as a sort of
bridge between “pre-Austrian economists and Austrian tradition” (p. 68). Salin-2000, p. 35; 40, connects
certain French liberals to the Austrian School by saying that, together with Turgot and Say, Bastiat had
“reconnu le caractère fondamentalement subjectif de la valeur (contrairement à A. Smith ou à D.
Ricardo)”; and by naming Bastiat a precursor of Hayek (p. 52). For a more problematic treatment of the
relationship between Bastiat and Hayek, see Dorn-1981 and Feldman-1995.
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Our argument here is that Bastiat enjoyed a certain success within the
tradition of classical liberalism, but it was not unequivocal.28 Notwithstanding the
‘statist’ attacks of turn-of-the-century liberals, Bastiat’s ideas were flawed from 
the standpoint of defenders of the classical liberal tradition, which presented 
a dilemma for classical liberalism. Because it required the disappearance of the
State, Bastiat’s liberalism attracted greater criticism than that of John S. Mill, who
assigned important functions to the state and paved the way for contemporary
interventionism. This happened notwithstanding the fact that both thinkers had
based their political theory on a false (though for different reasons) theory of
value. It could therefore be said that Mill’s reputation was saved precisely by his
‘statism’ and that Bastiat’s failure was due to his ‘anti-statism’.  On the one hand,
Bastiat’s political theory appeared as too extreme, and on the other hand, it was
founded on an economic theory rejected by socialists, interventionists, and by the
Austrians as well. What undermined both Bastiat and classical liberalism was the
fact that ever-increasing conflicts of interests, rather than the hoped-for
harmonization of interests, seemed to be occurring at the time that the market
seemed to have reached its maximum application. 
Today it is possible to construct a liberal political order that surmounts the
theoretical obstacles that proved insuperable to Bastiat. Indeed, following
Rothbard’s more positive reappraisal of Bastiat, the nature and originality of his
contribution can be better identified and appreciated. Even though he may have
had an incomplete understanding of the fact, Bastiat was aware that if the purpose
of social institutions is to produce security as regards individual expectations, then
the market can produce this result in a more timely, more stable, and more efficient
manner than the State. Moreover, the market can satisfy a greater number of
different individual expectations without having to select arbitrarily among them,
something that politics cannot avoid doing. Therefore, Bastiat’s relevance and
importance within the contemporary debate on liberalism does not so much rest
on his theory of the prospective harmony of interests founded on Providence and
on his theory of “value-service”, as it does on the replacement of the state by the
market in the production of ‘security’.
We believe that this insight is exactly what makes his thought still interesting
and relevant today. At the same time, we recognize that this essential feature of
Bastiat’s thought is merely an insight, unsupported by an appropriate theoretical
structure. The full appreciation of this insight had to await Hayek’s formulation of
the production and distribution of knowledge. For it was Hayek who explained
how a mutually satisfying exchanges are linked to particular distributions of
knowledge, even in extreme cases overlooked by Bastiat.
One objective of this essay, therefore, will be to point out the weaknesses
of Bastiat’s explanation of the establishment of a social/economic ‘order’. The
28 See, for example, Guido de Ruggiero (Ruggiero-1925, p. 197) who criticized Bastiat because he
advocated “an almost complete cancellation of the state [as the] natural deployment of certain unctuous
harmonies [...] in such a sentimental work as the Armonie Economiche, which has rightly been the
target of the socialists’ satire [and where] eighteenth-century collective optimism echoes once again with
its identification of individual and collective interest.”
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problem is that he envisions order as the outcome of evolutionary progress, a
process that does not admit obstacles to progress in this regard caused by
“dispersion of knowledge in society”. If the latter is admitted, spontaneously
established order may not occur. Or alternatively, it becomes established much
more slowly, and therefore over a much longer period of time, than Bastiat’s
theory predicts. From this point of view, order is not so much a consequence of
Providence, but is rather the result of the cultural (non natural) selection of certain
types of information and its dissemination, and of behavior that tends to minimize
the unintended consequences (or ‘transaction costs’) of human action. In other
words, it favors property rights exchanges in conditions of freedom and time such
that each individual may satisfy his or her own needs through interaction with
other individuals. This means that Bastiat, like others, did not address the issue of
the relation between the establishment of an order and subjective time
expectations, including amongst these the minimization of the time necessary for
their accomplishment. Such a solution becomes practicable only by resorting to the
theory of human action within a ‘subjectivist economy’.
Another objective of this paper is to evaluate the objections to Bastiat’s
economic and political concepts raised by Luigi Taparelli d’Azeglio in the years
1855-56.29 D’Azeglio emphasizes the opposition between the political and
economic philosophy of Bastiat’s liberal Catholicism and that of Catholicism itself,
which was far from accepting the market economy based on self-interest as a tool
of Divine Providence. The importance of this controversy is that it allows us to
examine the theological-religious presuppositions of Bastiat’s theory of his theory
of the harmonization of interests, both as between individual interests and between
individual and collective interests – suppositions that have been persistently
overlooked in previous evaluations of Bastiat’s thought.
2. The theory of the harmony of interests
Our analysis in this section is based mainly based on Bastiat’s essay, La Loi,
and on the introductory sections of Harmonies Economiques, both dating from
1850. In our opinion, these works clearly show that Bastiat’s negative concept of
the State and its functions is based on his conviction that the State’s actions can
only result in hindering or retarding the natural process of the harmonization of
interests.  
Bastiat’s theory of the harmony of interests is founded on a notion of
natural right in which two main lines of reasoning converge: Lockean thought (in
which natural rights consist of person, liberty and property30) and Thomistic
thought, which involves a notion of natural right different from that defined
29 See Taparelli-1856. On the relevance of economics within such journals see Bianchini-1996, pp. 289-310.
30 Bastiat-1850a, p. 343; Engl. transl. p. 52.
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canonically in Luigi Taparelli d’Azeglio’s treatise, Saggio teoretico di diritto
naturale appoggiato sul fatto (1855). The theory of the harmony of interests is not
so much an expression of Physiocratic doctrine (although this may also have
affected Bastiat), as it is a reflection of a certain strand of liberal Catholicism and its
religious vision of the world, man, freedom and the market. This particular strand
has always been a minority view among Catholics, and sometimes it has even been
considered as spurious.
The tendency to overlook the role of Providence in his theory has led
Bastiat’s critics to miss the central core of his political philosophy. As a result, his
laissez-faire has been interpreted usually as the belief that social conflicts will
eventually converge via a ‘natural’ mechanism that is independent of the role of
Providence in human life. Keynes’ criticism is typical of this sort:
…let us clear from the ground the metaphysical or general
principles upon which, from time to time, laissez-faire has been
founded. It is not true that individuals possess a prescriptive
‘natural liberty’ in their economic activities. There is no ‘compact’
conferring perpetual rights on those who Have or on those who
Acquire. The world is not so governed from above that private and
social interest always coincide. It is not so managed here below
that in practice they coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the
principles of economics that enlightened self-interest always
operates in public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest generally
is enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to promote
their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these.
Experience does not show that individuals, when they make up a
social unit, are always less clear-sighted than when they act
separately.31
Although Keynes is the author of these words, the criticism can be tracedd back to
Bastiat’s socialist and anarchist critics. It presumes that Bastiat’s principle of non-
intervention derives support from a sort of physiological mechanism that, in fact,
has no place in Bastiat’s theory, nor in Smith’s for that matter. Bastiat’s concept of
human nature is intertwined with Providence. He maintains that social interests
end up harmonizing because of the action of Providence, not Nature. Moreover,
for Bastiat this result will occur spontaneously provided the state does not frustrate
the design of Providence.
The centrality of Providence in Bastiat’s social thought is verified by a close
reading of all his writings, but some passages are more imposing than others. In
Deux morales (1848), he wrote: “political economy has not been given the mission
of finding out what society would be like if it had pleased God to make man
different from what he is”, i.e., a being who has “fondness for the fruits of toil and
repugnance to its pains”. Since their distribution tends to become increasingly
equal, it is evident that in our society there is “some natural and providential force
31 Keynes-1926, pp. 287-88.
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[… and ] that God has put it there.” For Bastiat, Providence is a beneficial force that
tends progressively to reduce the evil force of spoliation; by doing so (in the guise
of ‘economic morality’, which is different from ‘religious morality’), it involves man,
“in his passive role [en tant que patient] [… and ] it strives to disseminate enough
good sense, knowledge, and justifiable mistrust among oppressed masses to make
oppression more and more difficult and dangerous.”32 According to Bastiat,
economics involves a study of such forces. By tracing out a path that shows man
“the necessary consequences of his acts”, it distinguishes itself from morals
understood as a process of purification and correction of man’s performance “in
his active role [en tant qu’agent]”. It follows that economics “does not tell us
everything, does not include everything, is not the universal science.”33 Nevertheless,
it allows Bastiat to proclaim that “free trade distributes in the most uniform and
equitable manner the fruits that Providence grants to the labor of man.”34
Though incomplete and unfinished in many respects, Bastiat’s Harmonies
économiques is the most mature product of his work on this subject. It starts by
stating that “all men’s impulses, when motivated by legitimate self-interest, fall into
a harmonious social pattern [Tous les intérêts légitimes sont harmoniques].” His use
of the phrase “legitimate self-interest” suggests that the pursuit of subjective interests
does not always produce ‘harmony’, and therefore that a distinction should be
made between different types of interests, using criteria other than ‘subjective’
ones. But because this approach is inconsistent with a ‘subjectivist theory of value’
we may ask where does Bastiat stand? Legitimacy comes from non-interference.
Hence, Bastiat affirms, “men’s interests, when left to themselves, tend to form a
harmonious combination and to work together for progress and the general good
… the practical solution to the social problem is simply not to thwart these interests
or to try to redirect them.”35
If harmony fails, the reason must be sought in the fact that some people –
for instance, socialists – “propose to substitute coercion for freedom, an artificial
social order for the natural social order, and a work of their own contrivance for
the handiwork of God.” As a consequence, given the strict relationship existing
between God and freedom, between natural laws and social laws, “it is not true
that the great laws of Providence are hastening society along the road to disaster”,
contrary to the assumption made by many, first and foremost the socialists, who do
not realize that, if God exists, the laws of light cannot be different from those of
interests. For this reason, if God’s wisdom and his history are revealed in social
mechanics, he who has “faith in the wisdom of the laws of Providence [has] faith in
liberty”. These laws are bad only if they are disturbed by men’s actions and by 
the institutions created by man to pursue unnatural ends. Therefore, they are
harmonious because that is how Providence intended to make human nature, even
32 In Bastiat-1848a, pp. 149-50; Engl. transl. pp. 148-49.
33 In Bastiat-1848a, pp. 150-52; Engl. transl. pp. 149-51.
34 In Bastiat-1848a, p. 188; Engl. transl. p. 187.
35 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 2-7; Engl. transl. pp. xxi-xxvi.
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though evil is not excluded because free men are able to make mistakes. From this
point of view, good presupposes the knowledge of evil, and it is precisely when
human actions conflict with divine laws that “the natural laws [lois naturelles] of
the social order [are not shown] in all their majestic harmony.”36 On this point,
Bastiat joins freedom and providence: “if the laws of Providence are harmonious,
they can be so only when they operate under conditions of freedom, for otherwise
harmony is lacking,”37 and in the long run it is vain to impose on men aims that
differ from the natural aims established by Providence.
But can the state, which is by nature coercive, be helpful in achieving
harmony? Bastiat’s answer is no, because the state – “the great fictitious entity”– is
an artificial and fraudulent organization, which always acts with force and cannot
be in harmony with the natural rights of individuals,38 and with the general,
providential and unwritten laws of society.39 As a consequence, it is useless to
expect that the “natural tendencies of mankind” may be achieved through those
artificial organizations that deny the natural tendency towards harmony and which,
in doing so, are also subjected to very high costs and conditions (the use of force,
persuasion and fraud).40 Therefore, the thesis according to which interests are
naturally antagonistic is false, because it does not ask the question: “what social
order necessarily results” from the fact that man is “as God saw fit to make him”?41
To act against these laws means accepting high social costs (i.e., “transactions
carried on between people who do not know each other”), while the elements that
allow these laws to be known, understood and affirmed are freedom, personal
interest (“the mainspring of human nature”), and utility understood as “everything
that effects the satisfaction of wants.” Taken together, these arguments suggest that
in Bastiat’s approach, harmony – which will be progressively achieved by “replacing
onerous utility by gratuitous utility”42 – is to be seen as the progressive elimination
of human errors: the discovery of honest behaviour in the conduct of our lives,
consistent with the design of Providence.
It is in this context that Bastiat’s concept of ‘value’ acquires fundamental
importance. To Bastiat, vlaue is “the comparative estimation of reciprocal services,”
and ‘human needs’ are that to which God has subjected us: to satisfy these needs,
we must necessarily undergo suffering, deprivation and pain. Furthermore, neither
the market nor political economy are responsible for all this, but are instead the
remedies.43 Primary needs are those concerning the preservation of life. Because
these needs, just like more complex ones, “are not a fixed and unchangeable
36 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 10-15; Engl. transl. pp. xxviii-xxxii.
37 Bastiat-1850c, p; 18; Engl. transl. p. xxxiv.
38 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 18-19; Engl. transl. p. xxxv.
39 Bastiat-1850c, p. 24; Engl. transl. p. 2.
40 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 30ff.; Engl. transl. pp. 7ff.
41 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 48-49; Engl. transl. p. 23.
42 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 51-53; Engl. transl. pp. 25-27. 
43 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 59-63; Engl. transl. pp. 32-35.
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quantity”, it is very difficult for political economy to establish a criterion upon
which it can be construed as an exact science. Given such a situation and due to
the fact that human needs can be satisfied in a great variety of ways, “the balance
between the means and the end is the first law of all harmony.” Therefore, “unless
Nature, Providence [...] has fallen into the most cruel and shocking contradiction,
we must presume, since our desires are without limit, that our means of satisfying
them are likewise without limit.” This is supported by the fact that “Nature and
labor function together for the satisfaction of our wants and our desires.”44 Utility,
understood as “the property of rendering a service,” even though not in an equal
manner, is therefore “transmitted sometimes by Nature, sometimes by labor alone,
almost always by the conjunction of Nature and labor.” As a matter of fact, “to
bring a thing to its complete state of utility, the contribution of labor is in inverse
ratio to the contribution of Nature.”45
Bastiat, therefore, regarded the theory of value as the essence of political
economy but, unlike those who define wealth as something deriving from labor,
he maintains that “the gratuitous gifts of Nature, however great their utility, have
no value.” His aim is to maintain utility and value, while reducing onerousness and
labor. It follows that “in bringing a thing to the highest degree of utility, man’s share
in the action is in inverse ratio to Nature’s” and human action that transforms matter
is a service in whose “free appraisal […] is the basis of value.”46 Labor, therefore, is
“the use of our faculties for the satisfaction of our wants.” For this reason – although
“the science of economics […] does not have the same advantage as the so-called
exact sciences, of possessing a measure, a yardstick, enabling it to determine the
precise intensity of desires, efforts, and satisfactions” – “a man’s well-being is not
measured by his efforts, but by his satisfactions”: “the value of every economic
activity is determined, not by the labor it entails, but by the positive effect it produces,
which in turn results in an increase or decrease of the general welfare.”47
Thanks to the possibility of carrying out exchanges, it is only in the welfare
state that our faculties can exceed our needs, and the condition for exchanges is
that be mutually satisfactory, i.e., produce “an equivalent service” to the effort
made. Bastiat does not say that this satisfaction must be ‘subjectively equivalent’,
but only ‘equivalent’. And this non-subjective nature of satisfaction derived from
exchanges is in some sense confirmed by the fact that Bastiat holds that “the general
nature of exchange is to lessen the amount of effort in relation to the satisfaction,”
to increase “gratuitous utility” and mutual advantages. Therefore, the freer the
transactions, the greater will be natural utility and harmony, ultimately ending up
by depending on the increase in natural utility, and “the good of each is favorable
to the good of all, even as the good of all is favorable to the good of each.”48
44 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 72-78; Engl. transl. pp. 42-47.
45 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 79-80; Engl. transl. p. 48.
46 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 82-85; Engl. transl. pp. 50-53.
47 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 86-92; Engl. transl. pp. 54-58.
48 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 108-122; Engl. transl. pp. 73-84.
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According to Bastiat, “the harmony of the providential laws that govern
human society” requires a true notion of value, which in turn requires intellectual
vigilance. 
…the notion of value will be an imperfect one, an
erroneous one, if, neglecting the mean, we base it on the extremes,
which are phenomena of our sensations–wants and satisfactions,
which are intimate, non transferable, not subject to measurement
from one individual to another– instead of founding it one our
activity, our effort, our exchange or reciprocal services, since these
are capable of comparison, appraisal, evaluation, and can indeed
be evaluated for the very reason that they are exchanged.
Therefore, in “the notion of value implying acquisition through effort […] value
must refer to the efforts made by men in order to secure the satisfaction of their
wants.” It is “the relationship existing between two services that have been
exchanged” and “one could say that the evaluation of services tends to come closer
to the absolute truth and justice as men progress in knowledge and morality.”49 In
other words, only if knowledge is equal and widespread will individuals be able to
attribute the correct value to goods and services. The example of air, which has no
value “since it occasions no effort, it calls for no service,” is used by Bastiat to
assert that “value comes only from the service that has been rendered.”50
Following this line of reasoning, harmony comes from the discovery of the
natural balance between services, and it is for this reason that he can state that
“after studying the providential laws that govern the social order, [what we] declare
is this: These laws are harmonious”, even though evil exists and even if they act
slowly in remedying the damage produced by ignorance and error. “Study the laws
of Providence, marvel at them, and allow them to operate; …if men’s interests are
harmonious, they need only be understood, and harmony and the good life will be
achieved, for men naturally pursue their own interests.” Only if the interests are
“mutually antagonistic by nature […] can it be said that there is no other means of
achieving harmony than by forcing, frustrating, and thwarting the interests of all
men.” Hence the clarion call to “permit the laws of Providence to act”; the warning
that we can be mistaken in many ways even about our own needs and interests;
and the thesis that evil originates from human passions and weakness of judgment.51
3. The ‘grande fiction’
This process is hindered or retarded by man’s presumption that he can
improve upon Providence by being able to better identify goals and the means to
49 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 141-47; Engl. transl. pp. 100-05. We note that no Austrian is likely to endorse these
definitions.
50 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 148-49; Engl. transl. p. 107.
51 Bastiat-1850c, pp. 567-71; Engl. transl. pp. 469-73.
13
Cubeddu and Masala: Natural Right, Providence, and Order
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2001
achieve them. The tool for accomplishing this ‘improvement’ is, of course, the
State. In L’État (1848), Bastiat not only provides a famous definition of the State:
“the state is the great fictitious entity by which everyone seeks to live at the expense
of everyone else (L’État c’est la grande fiction à travers laquelle tout le monde
s’efforce de vivre aux dépens de tout le monde)”,52 but he also stresses its violent
and fraudulent nature, a theme that has been resumed later by Libertarians. 
As usual, Bastiat’s sparkling prose is studded with brilliant quips that
indelibly impress his ideas upon the reader. Although he offers little analytical
support for his definition, he clearly grasps the core of the issue when he points
out that the prestige of the State is based on the credibility of its promise to give
back to each individual more than it takes from him. Bastiat denies the State’s
credibility because it is “fundamentally impossible for it to confer a particular
advantage on some of the individuals who constitute the community without
inflicting a greater damage on the entire community.”53 A similar hypocrisy is
involved in the State’s contention that it is the only agency capable of guaranteeing
justice, security, enforcement of the law and the granting of rights. Bastiat, as an
exponent of the Lockean tradition, agrees only as regards this last function, but he
simultaneously insinuates that, in reality, the State may not be constitutionally able
to carry out such a function. He denounces as “chimerical, absurd, childish,
contradictory, and dangerous” the belief that it is possible to establish a synthesis
that “consists in requiring everything from the state without giving anything to
it.”54
The great fiction, therefore, consists in the capacity of a state to deceive
different social groups at different times into believing that they can receive from
the State more than the State has taken from them, that is to say taking from
everybody in order to distribute to different subjects. The State bases its prestige on
“ce qu’on voit” and tends to hide the fact that it is able to redistribute what it can
take only by the use of force. From an economic standpoint, Bastiat believed the
consequence was disastrous.
Society is the aggregate of all the services that men perform
for one another by compulsion or voluntarily, that is to say, public
services and private services. The first, imposed and regulated by
the law, which is not always easy to change when necessary, can
long outlive their usefulness and still retain the name of public
services, even when they are no longer anything but public
nuisances. The second are in the domain of the voluntary, i.e., of
individual responsibility. Each gives and received what he wishes,
or what he can, after bargaining. These services are always presumed
to have a real utility, exactly measured by their comparative value.55
52 Bastiat-1848b, p. 332; Engl. transl. p. 144. As Leoni-1961, p. 138, writes: “admittedly, this definition is
valid also in our own time”.
53 Bastiat-1848b, p. 334; Engl. transl. p. 146.
54 Bastiat-1848b, p. 340-41; Engl. transl. p. 151.
55 Bastiat-1850b, p. 356; Engl. transl. p. 19.
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For Bastiat, the “pressure of competition” is the only way to stop the
“disastrous parasitism” produced by the “exaggerated development of public
services.”56 But the socialists have managed to convince many people that the
prices of goods paid to the intermediaries in a market economy exceed the prices
that would prevail if the State were to produce them.57 In this way, the socialists
“ceaselessly oppose free association in present-day society. They do not realize
that a free society is a true association much superior to any of those that they
concoct out of their fertile imaginations.”58 Bastiat realized that the great fiction is
founded on the capacity of the State to convince citizens that the State itself is the
antidote to uncertainty and that it has the ability to satisfy all individual expectations
in the fastest possible time. 
Rather than fight the spread of this belief by developing the theoretical side
of his doctrine, Bastiat concentrated on exposing the ‘great fiction’ as an illusion,
something that contradicts the very nature of humanity. Nature cannot be accelerated
by producing laws and by their forcible and costly enforcement.59 Bastiat’s every
effort seemed to be directed towards the aim of making visible that which various
entities seek to hide through artifice and fiction. In other words, he sought to show
that artificial arrangements could not be maintained in the long term because they
are not natural, and because the further any system moves away from the true nature
of exchange among free men, the higher the cost of maintaining that system. 
A close correspondence can therefore be observed between his essay on
the law and the Harmonies, as can be inferred from the fact that the reduction in
the cost of exchanges between men, and therefore in the condition of harmony,
will be the result of a natural process of enlightenment and moralization. If “to use
force is not to produce, but to destroy,”60 then the verdict on the State cannot be
anything but irremediably negative. The State cannot be based on forms of
exchange that do not admit ‘spoliation’ which means that its attempt at producing
security by way of taxation is, in reality, a process of destruction – first and foremost
a destruction of that social order “so admirably arranged by the divine Inventor,” in
which the conciliation between economy and morals is accomplished,61 followed
by the destruction of the very bases of peaceful coexistence. These insightful views
remain politically valid and fecund, even though the theoretical assumptions on
which Bastiat sought to base them have been found to be lacking. Certainly Bastiat
showed great courage because his views ran counter to the ‘deification of the State’
tide that was beginning to engulf Europe.
Bastiat directed his attack against a rising chorus in favor of the legislative
production of law. He tried to re-institute the theory of natural right against the
56 Bastiat-1850b, pp. 356-58; Engl. transl. pp. 19-20.
57 Bastiat-1850b, p. 357; Engl. transl. p. 20.
58 Bastiat-1850b, p. 361; Engl. transl. p. 23.
59 Bastiat-1850b, p. 364ff.; Engl. transl. pp. 26 ff.
60 Bastiat-1850b, p. 368; Engl. transl. p. 31.
61 Bastiat-1850b, p. 385; Engl. transl. p. 44.
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new tide, claiming that “the law […] has destroyed its own object” in its attempt to
implement misguided selfishness and false philanthropy.62 Natural rights (life,
freedom and property) exist prior to the law-making activity of man, and the
legitimacy of collective rights is also based on individual rights. Law is therefore
the verification of the natural right of legitimate defense and guarantee of life,
liberty and property.63 Ultimately it is identifiable with the State, if the latter is
correctly interpreted as the producer of security [sureté] as regards those rights. The
guarantee of a pre-existing natural order that preceded the advent of politics, i.e.
the “nonintervention of the state in private affairs,” is, after all, that which allows
“wants and satisfactions [to be] develop[ed] in their natural order.”64 Bastiat
attributed the excessive role assigned to politics “under the pretext of organization,
regulation, protection, or encouragement”65 to the adverse teachings of Rousseau,
Saint-Just and Robespierre – who believed in the “omnipotence of the law” and
attributed to government “the function […] to direct the physical and moral forces
of the nation toward the ends for which it was founded.”66 Such beliefs have
produced one of the strangest phenomena of all time, which attributes infallibility
to legislators in the mistaken belief that the general will is incapable of error.67
This dangerous belief transformed the notion of law from that which served to
establish justice and preserve “…the pre-existing individual right to legitimate self-
defense” to that which revolutionized the natural order. Bastiat denounced this
development in the harshest terms (a denunciation that was to be stressed repeatedly
within the liberal tradition and would reach its fullest expression in Hayek68) as
follows: “…base the law on the principle of fraternity, proclaim that everything
good and everything bad derive from it, that it is responsible for all individuals ills,
all social inequality, and you will open the door to an endless series of complaints,
resentments, disturbances, and revolutions.”69
Bastiat foresaw a different outcome if society embraced the theory of
natural right: “under the law of justice, under the rule of right, under the influence
of liberty, security, stability, and responsibility, [...] every man will attain to the full
worth and dignity of his being, and [...] mankind will achieve, in a calm and orderly
wayæslowly, no doubt, but surelyæthe progress to which it is destined.”70 And this
would be assured, as always, by Providence: 
God has endowed mankind also with all that it needs to
accomplish its destiny. There is a providential social physiology, as
62 Bastiat-1850a, p. 345; Engl. transl. p. 53.
63 Bastiat-1850a, p. 344; Engl. transl. p. 52.
64 Bastiat-1850a, p. 344.; Engl. transl. p. 53.
65 Bastiat-1850a, p. 351; Engl. transl. p. 58.
66 Bastiat-1850a, pp. 377ff.; Engl. transl. pp. 81ff.
67 Bastiat-1850a, pp. 381ff.; Engl. transl. pp. 86ff.
68 See Hayek-1960, 1969 and 1973-99, I.
69 Bastiat-1850a, pp. 387ff.; Engl. transl. pp. 91ff.
70 Bastiat-1850a, pp. 390-91; Engl. transl. p. 94.
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there is a providential individual physiology. Social organs too are
so constituted as to develop harmoniously in the open air of liberty
[…]. Let us cast out all artificial systems and give freedom a chance
– freedom, which is an act of faith in God and in His handiwork.71
By virtue of these statements Bastiat, like the other exponents of the anti-
statist tradition of classical liberalism, such as Herbert Spencer, occupies a
prominent position in the liberal and libertarian traditions. What is problematic,
however, is whether Bastiat influenced these traditions directly or was merely
aligned with them by virtue of an affinity of ideas. If we date the rebirth of classical
liberalism by the publication of Mises’ Socialism (1922) we are forced to admit that
Bastiat is not vital. But this is not surprising. Mises in particular attempted to re-
establish classical liberalism on subjective human action rather than on the labor
theory of value, and on this point Bastiat was already in the vanguard. If we look
to other forms of contemporary libertarianism, however, Bastiat looms more
prominent. For example, in his critique of the function of the State as a producer of
certainty, we have to acknowledge that Bastiat was among the first (perhaps
together with Molinari) to show how such a function could be carried out at less
cost and perhaps without coercion by a competitive market economy based on
natural right. Likewise, we must acknowledge the deep influence that Bastiat
exerted on the exponents of liberal Catholicism through his emphasis on the role
of Providence and the full compatibility between the market economy and the
Christian tradition.
4. The order of Providence
The manner in which an order is generated and gradually reinforced has
always constituted the central focus of reflections in political philosophy. Bastiat’s
solution to this problem is located mid-way between the evolutionary and the
providentialist approaches. In the first case, order is the possible (or fortuitous)
result of a selection of partly natural and partly cultural actions, whose proportions
may vary from time to time, but which tend over time to enhance the cultural aspect.
In the second case, order is inscribed within a divine design, and its accomplishment
depends on the time that individuals take to grasp it and implement in an unimpeded
way.
As we have seen, Bastiat favored the mode of conduct that allowed “the
laws of Providence” to work without hindrance. The road may be long, and
complicated by the existence of ‘evil’, and by the limits of human knowledge, but
the objective is attainable because the direction is known. Faith avows that the act
of creation has resulted in humans who enjoy the freedom to err, but who are
71 Bastiat-1850a, pp. 392-93; Engl. transl. p. 95-96.
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nevertheless endowed with “a providential social physiology, just as there is a
providential individual physiology.” It would be contradictory for this point of
view to assume that the act of creation regards human physiology only and is not
extended to social physiology. However, if the divine message is a message of
salvation understandable in every era by every man who is in a state of grace, one
cannot help noticing that Bastiat confounds the providential with the evolutionary.
For if harmony consisted in the capacity to select among behaviors that favor it,
each epoch would be capable of achieving it. But, as a matter of fact, Bastiat tells
us that harmony is also the result of prolonged evolution, which is continuously
undermined by the prospect of detours, through error, from the main road. As a
consequence, this will not be an objective within reach of every epoch, but rather
the result of a process of cumulative wisdom and understanding of the laws of
Providence. As a consequence, freedom itself ends up being identified with a sort
of rational acceptance of Providence; or, more specifically, with the idea of not
hindering it – a this circumstance reminiscent of Hegel’s distinction between
‘subjective freedom’ and ‘objective freedom’. 
This kind of solution to the problem of order differs sharply from that
provided by classical political philosophy. The latter regarded order as the possible
outcome of men’s rational efforts directed towards the establishment of the best
political order for each age, and believed this was possible because the natural
essence of the universe can be understood by learned individuals in every age. In
contrast, for Bastiat as well as other exponents of Christian tradition, order was the
result of an eschatological historical process toward which history progressively
tends. Bastiat affirms this notion more than once in his recurrent expression, “let
the laws of Providence act”. When these laws are understood correctly, that is to
say by distinguishing the choses honnêtes from their opposite, they tend toward
harmony. The State becomes the tool to carry out this distinction and the guarantor
of that which is honest – this means, first of all, the natural rights to life, freedom
and property; and furthermore, security and justice as the “balance between
services”. Unfortunately, the State, as Bastiat never ceases to remind us, has been,
and is constantly taken to mean something rather different, namely as the means of
reversing the natural order that tends toward the harmonization of legitimate
interests, and as the tool to accelerate social progress. Hence, the State is involved
in constant intervention to guarantee natural rights, actions that might seem
desirable, were it not for the fact that it requires the use of coercion, because the
same individuals can cherish mistaken notions of both procedural goals and
legitimate interests. Of course, Bastiat rejects this notion, if only because this would
end up attributing excessive power to rulers.
If we admit that society and order have a sort of providential nature, what
appears to be unacceptable in Bastiat’s perspective is that individuals might take
advantage of it to different degrees. Admittedly it could be said that such an
eventuality is not particularly negative within a conception of order as a possibility
that may present itself in the course of an evolution largely depending on chance,
or fortuitousness. In a Providence-based view, on the other hand, this circumstance
could hardly escape the charge of being unfair, as it would favor some individuals
(those who are closer to the accomplishment of the goal) over others (those who
are further from it). Moreover, if we place this reasoning in a theoretical framework
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that excludes Providence, Bastiat’s theory of order would be of little use in the
quest to understand how any order can be generated, enhanced and developed. 
As an example of the distinction sought here, let us consider the
Menger/Hayek theory of the emergence of social institutions, which seeks to
explain “the most noteworthy problem of the social sciences.” Arguably the most
important social institutions, language, religion, law, the state, markets, competition,
money, prices, etc. – which “serve the common welfare and are extremely significant
for its development” – are not only not designed by individuals, and therefore are
natural, but they also emerged “without a common will directed toward establishing
them.”72 In this sense, order is understood as a complex of rules produced by
‘cultural evolution’; once they are known and imitated, it is possible to reduce the
uncertainty inherent in mutual exchanges, and therefore allow individuals to
exercise mutually free choices for the purpose of fulfilling their own subjective
needs and ends. Having emerged spontaneously, however, Menger denies that
such institutions follow a naturally positive evolution: 
…but never, and this is the essential point in the matter
under review, may science dispense with testing for their suitability
those institutions which have come about ‘organically’. It must,
when careful investigation so requires, change and better them
according to the measure of scientific insight and the practical
experience at hand. No era may renounce this ‘calling’73.
Hayek followed Menger in the basic belief that institutions are the result 
of a ‘cultural’ rather than a natural process.74 Because the social order is the
unintentional product of a cultural evolution, it cannot be taken for granted. In The
Sensory Order Hayek described the process by which ‘sensorial data’ is classified
and communicated, wherein the pace of development is connected to the
particular, and therefore cultural and unequal, distributions of knowledge in
society that catallactics may favor by carrying out the function of producer of
certainty, which, in other circumstances, would have to performed by politics and,
therefore, by the State. Such an order, in the Austrian view, is based on the ‘theory
of subjective values’. 
According to Leo Strauss (who criticizes liberalism as building on Locke’s
theory of natural right) there is a radically new circumstance at the origin of
classical liberalism, namely the severing of the tie that existed between virtue-
morality and the ‘best political order’, tie that even Machiavelli did not break.
Strauss argues that “Locke’s teaching on property, and therewith his whole political
philosophy, are revolutionary not only with regard to the Biblical tradition but with
regard to the philosophic tradition as well.”75 Economic liberalism, therefore,
72 Menger-1883, pp. 162ff.; Engl. transl. p. 146.
73 Menger-1883, p. 287; Engl. transl. p. 234.
74 See Hayek-1973-79, III, Epilogue, pp. 154ff.
75 Strauss-1953, p. 248.
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harbors a totally new notion of how a political order is generated. The best
political order, i.e., the one that leads to “the solution of the political problem by
economic means,”76 and that tends towards the virtually complete elimination of
collective choice, thus becomes the product of “accidental causes modified by the
prudential handling of situations as they arose”. As a consequence, this order will
not even have an end, as it will reflect the constant endeavor to fulfill individual
expectations which, prompted by the constant and subjective attempt at improving
initial conditions by using the tools of fallible knowledge, change continuously and
without a precise and universally shared direction. What thereby ensues is that the
teachings of political economy as regards the origin of public prosperity are fully
applied to the formation of political order: “the common good is the product of
activities which are not by themselves ordered toward the common good.” “The
good or rational order is the result of forces which do not themselves tend toward
the good or the rational order.”77
Strauss’ interpretation of liberal order is different from Bastiat’s. In Bastiat’s
framework, individual freedom produces ‘harmony’ in its application only when it
cooperates with Providence. Even if Bastiat fully accepted Locke’s notion of
natural rights, he believed that order is not a fortuitous result, but rather the
outcome of a process that is propelled by Providence. That this does not hold for
the Austrians can also be deduced from Hayek’s analysis of Bernard de Mandeville’s
theory.78 For Mandeville, the ‘common good’ is not the direct result of individual
and social virtue, but rather the unintentional product of private and public vice.79
Once we recognize that this was also the point of disagreement between
Mandeville and Smith regarding the nature of the ‘invisibile hand,’ 80 (which Smith
also viewed as an expression of Providence), it becomes clear that the solution to
Bastiat’s problem of order is different from that provided by the exponents of
classical and Austrian liberalism. It is a solution that grafts Locke’s theory of
natural rights onto a new departure from Catholic thought. Here too, natural law
exists prior to the State and natural rights have a theological basis; but they do not
coincide. Like other liberal Catholic thinkers, Bastiat tends to merge two traditions
of thought that do not easily combine, the liberal-Christian tradition, whose order
springs from the gradual disclosure of the design of Providence, and second liberal
tradition, exemplified by Burke and the Austrians, according to which order
springs from the ‘prudential manipulation of events’.
76 Strauss-1959, p. 49.
77 Strauss-1953, pp. 313-15.
78 See Hayek-1978, pp. 249ff.
79 We doubt, however, whether it is appropriate to speak of a “common good” of society for Austrians
and Libertarians in the terms used by the Catholic Bastiat. For the later traditions, “common good”
corresponds respectively and exclusively to the Rule of Law and to Natural Right.
80 See Smith-1759, pp. 308ff.
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It is this merger that provoked the criticisms of Taparelli d’Azeglio and
Matteo Liberatore;81 two writers who upheld a Catholic orthodoxy opposed to the
Protestant political theology that heavily influenced Catholicism from the mid
nineteenth century onwards. Taparelli, heir and champion of the Catholic tradition
of natural law, insisted on the distinction between natural law [legge naturale]
and not of natural Rights [diritti naturali]. The former is the “eternal law of the
Creator [… which] must regulate by leading towards the good.”82 By contrast, “the
right [diritto] is a power [potere] that does not depend on force [… but] is founded
on truth and good.”83 Therefore, “natural law” [diritto naturale] coincides with
ethics and, as it is grounded in natural principles, shows how man should exercise
the power of will [facoltà di volere].84 Therefore, the moral obligation of the
individual is to direct his or her own freedom according to a reason that “depends
on the supreme director of the universe.” And “since the law [la legge] is said to be
the system through which a superior manages his employees, reason naturally
manifests a law [una legge] to us, one that was conceived ab eterno by the
Supreme Organizer: and one that is called natural in our reason; in the ordering
Mind it is called eternal: the source of every other obligation and law [legge.]”85
The point we wish to stress here is that Bastiat’s notion of natural law
differs from the traditional Catholic notion. Perhaps without realizing it, Bastiat
tried to incorporate Locke’s notion of natural rights into the Catholic notion of
natural law, a path that has been taken by more recent supporters of liberal
Catholicism, but one specifically rejected by Taparelli. In Taparelli’s view, political
economy cannot be legitimately grounded in elements of utilitarianism and/or
epicureanism (i.e., the “animal parts and tendencies of man”). He therefore
regarded Bastiat’s political economy as perverse because it was grounded in
harmonic laws of Providence and self-interest, an inferior part of human nature.  It
excluded from economics precisely that which is most important for Taparelli: “any
idea of benevolence, equity, Christian charity.” As a consequence, it is very difficult
to derive from such presuppositions the conclusion drawn by Bastiat, according to
which “human interests abandoned to themselves are in harmony,” and even more
difficult to pass it off as the design of Providence. According to Taparelli, harmony
or order, as we have seen, do not originate from the untrammelled expression of
81 See Liberatore-1889, where the author, while claiming that property “derives from nature as a right”
and therefore cannot be abolished by the state (p. 181), reaffirms, against backers of laissez-faire, that
economics depends on politics and morals (pp. 15-17), harshly criticizing ‘modern Liberalism’ (p. 5).
Criticisms of Bastiat can be found also at pp. 38 (utility and value), 40 (Say), 96 (“witty inventions” on
value), 126, 140ff. (on the importance of natural agents in the creation of wealth and in the determination
of value; on how Bastiat’s theories backed socialism), 152 (Bastiat’s and Carey’s theories of value), 234 (on
free competition and laissez faire). See Bianchini (Bianchini-1996) on Liberatore and criticisms of laissez-
faire and on the separation of economics from ethics in La Civiltà Cattolica. In its day, Liberatore’s book
had a remarkable influence on the formation of economic culture within the clergy. 
82 Taparelli-1855, §§ 114, 115.
83 Taparelli-1855, §§ 341, 342, 343.
84 Taparelli-1855, Epilogo ragionato del saggio di diritto naturale, 2.
85 Taparelli-1855, Epilogo ragionato del saggio di diritto naturale, 25.
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individual interests, but rather from human action guided by moral duty, and by
those principles ranked higher by Christianity than individual interest and the right
to life, freedom and property.86
5. Conclusion
We conclude not only that Bastiat was not a ‘pre-Austrian’, but also that his
notion of natural rights was somewhat at odds with the orthodox Catholic thought
of his time. From this point of view, the charge of having restricted the field of
economics to the study of the ways in which individuals fulfill their needs, that is to
say their interests, does not seem to be unwarranted, and his approach, thus
defined, did not (and does not) correspond to the official position of the Catholic
Church.87 Another charge that is not unwarranted is that Bastiat excluded the
religious and ethical component of individual action from his field of investigation,
even as he appealed to Providence in order to justify his own theory of harmony
between individual interests on the one hand, and between private and public
interests on the other.88 Bastiat, therefore, reflects all the problems regarding the
nature of political order and the relationship between market economy and
Catholic social doctrine that have been the object of debate for decades.89
However, it is not wise for a ‘lay Austrian’ to venture too far into this land.
86 Taparelli-1856, III, pp. 613-14; French transl. pp. 48-49. On Taparelli’s criticism of Bastiat, see
Pellissier Tanon-1993.
87 Taparelli-1856, III, pp.613-14; French transl., pp.48-49. Taparelli’s volume was identified by Pius XI
as one of the “main treatises of Catholic learning”, cf. Taparelli-1940, p. v.
88 Taparelli, loc. cit., in reference to Bastiat’s essay, Deux Morales (1848a).
89 See Antiseri (a cura di)-1995, and Baldini-2001.
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